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On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia died, ending 
his three-decade reign as leader of the conservative wing of the 
Supreme Court.
1
 He was renowned for his unyielding, 
combative style, often offering withering criticism of those who 
disagreed with his views.
2
 That approach produced mixed 
results. He was the most-written about Justice in the 21st 
Century,
3
 but his derisive tone limited his effectiveness,
4
 
preventing him from assembling an enduring or consistent 
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 1. See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies 
at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/ 
antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0. 
 2. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
560 U.S. 702, 723–24 (2013) (“Justice Kennedy's other point—that we will 
have to decide when the claim of a judicial taking must be asserted—hardly 
presents an awe-inspiring prospect. These, and all the other ‘difficulties,’ 
‘difficult questions,’ and ‘practical considerations’ that Justice Kennedy 
worries may perhaps stand in the way of recognizing a judicial taking, are 
either nonexistent or insignificant.”) (citations omitted). 
 3. Benjamin Morris, How Scalia Became the Most Influential 
Conservative Jurist Since the New Deal, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 14, 2016), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-scalia-became-the-most-influential-
conservative-jurist-since-the-new-deal/. 
 4. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies 
at 79; Ardent Conservative Fought Liberalism’s Tide, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 
2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-antonin-scalia-20160213-
story.html. 
 5. For a discussion of ebb and flow of the conservative jurisprudence 
Justice Scalia advocated for in two doctrinal settings, constitutional standing 
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During the Scalia years, an unprecedented proportion of 
the cases before the Court were decided by a single vote.
6
 The 
public also increasingly viewed the Court as politicized,
7
 and in 




With the Court so divided, Justice Scalia’s death could 
herald in an era of deadlock in which the Justices divide evenly 
in a string of controversial, high-profile cases. Perhaps the 
Court is heading in that direction. As of now, three cases have 
involved tie votes, the most in decades. One of those cases, 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,
9
 likely 
constitutes the most high-profile case to involve a tie vote in 
recent memory. 
Other evidence suggests, however, that the Justices may 
be responding to the specter of tie votes by forging compromise, 
however temporary, to postpone resolution of the issues that 
divide them. In at least two instances, the Court appears to 
have gone to significant lengths to avoid evenly dividing. That 
pattern, if it holds, reflects the history of tie votes in the 
Supreme Court. While the prospect of tie votes has caused 
much hand-ringing, they have been rare and relatively 
insignificant. 
This essay considers both the history of tie votes in the 
Supreme Court and the current situation facing the Justices. It 
explains the doctrine attached to tie votes and the reasons they 
occur, and it provides a preview of an empirical study I 
performed of all tie votes that occurred between 1925 and 2015, 
which will be published later this year.
10
 This essay also 
examines the three cases that have involved tie votes that have 
emerged so far in October Term 2015, and two other cases in 
 
and regulatory takings, see Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures and the 
Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 139–42 (2014); Justin R. Pidot, The 
Invisibility of Jurisdictional Procedure and Its Consequences, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1405, 1413–14 (2012). 
 6. See David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of 
the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-
supreme-court/259155/. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Justin McCarthy, Disapproval of Supreme Court Edges to New High, 
GALLUP (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185972/disapproval-
supreme-court-edges-new-high.aspx. 
 9. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 10. See Justin R. Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
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which the Court appears to have implemented strategies to 
avoid ties. 
The Senate appears unlikely to confirm a replacement for 
Justice Scalia anytime soon.
11
 The Justices may, if they so 
choose, use this prolonged vacancy as an opportunity to explore 
new methods for resolving cases that evenly divide them. Such 
methods could address, at least modestly, the public’s 
perception that the Court is intractably polarized. 
I. THE HISTORY OF TIE VOTES 
Before turning to the tie votes of the current eight-member 
Court, this Part provides historical context for tie votes in the 
Supreme Court. This discussion examines the doctrine and 
form of the equally divided court, the circumstances that result 
in ties, and the relative frequency and importance of such 
decisions. In providing this analysis, I draw upon a dataset of 
the 164 tie votes that occurred between 1925 and 2015.
12
 
A. THE DOCTRINE AND FORM OF TIE VOTES 
The Court has a well-established rule that governs 
circumstances where the Justices evenly divide, which dates 
back to the late 18th Century.
13
 If the Justices divide evenly, 
the decision of the lower court is affirmed—either in its entirety 
or with respect to the issue that divided the Justices—but no 
Supreme Court precedent is created.
14
 The Supreme Court 
typically announces that it has deadlocked by issuing a per 
curium order stating simply “[t]he judgment is affirmed by an 
 
 11. See Harper Neidig, No Hearing for Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, 
McConnell Says, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:04 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ 
blog-briefing-room/news/273230-mcconnell-no-hearing-for-garland. 
 12. See Pidot, supra note 10. 
 13. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792); see also United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942). 
 14. See, e.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 n.7 
(1987) (“Of course, an affirmance by an equally divided Court is not entitled to 
precedential weight.”); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868). 
The rule governing equally divided courts applies only where the Justices are 
divided evenly on the correct result, rather than divided on the rationale for a 
result. In the latter case, a majority of the Justices would agree on the 
appropriate resolution of the case or issue and lower courts would ascertain 
the rule emerging from the case under the framework established by Marks v. 
United States. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see also Justin Marceau, Plurality 
Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 933 (2013) (examining the rule the Court created in Marks). 
  




 Of the 164 tie votes that occurred 
between 1925 and 2015, 149 were of this form.
16
 
The rule governing tie votes arose at a time when parties 
had a right to appeal cases to the Supreme Court.
17
 Because the 
Court had an obligation to resolve those appeals, the Justices 
needed a workable rule to address circumstances where they 
deadlocked. While the Court continues to apply the same rule 
today, the necessity from which the rule arose has all but 
disappeared. Since 1925, Congress has consistently reduced the 
mandatory docket of the Court.
18
 Only one of the 164 cases that 
involved a tie vote since 1925 would arise under the Court’s 
mandatory docket today.
19
 As a result, the Court could deploy—
and as I will discuss below perhaps has deployed— alternative 
procedures to dispose of cases in which the Justices divide 
evenly. For example, rather than announcing a tie vote, the 
Court could dismiss the writ of certiorari that gives rise to 
Supreme Court jurisdiction as improvidently granted, a process 
typically referred to as a “DIG.”
20
 Resolving a case through a 
DIG would have precisely the same effect as affirming by an 
equally divided court, but would allow the Justices to act in 
concert to resolve the case, potentially creating a more 
cooperative spirit on the Court. A DIG would also dispose of the 
case without the need for the Court to publicly proclaim that 
the Justices have deadlocked. 
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO TIE VOTES 
Because an odd number of Justices sit on the Supreme 
Court, tie votes are relatively rare.
21
 They can, however, arise 
in two situations. 
 
 15. See, e.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011). 
 16. For a detailed examination of other forms in which tie votes can occur, 
see Pidot, supra note 10, at Part III. 
 17. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 1 (1980). 
 18. See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids 
Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 FED. RULES DECISIONS 81, 87 (1988). 
 19. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part II. 
 20. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and 
the Sophisticated Use of DIGs, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 155, 155 (2010). This 
acronym is the one commonly used to refer to the court dismissing a writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted. See id. at 155 n.2. 
 21. Since the Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44, eight Associate Justices 
and one Chief Justice have constituted the Supreme Court. See Peter G. Fish, 
Justices, Number of, 550, 550 in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall, et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2005). Since 
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First, a Justice may recuse herself because of a conflict of 
interest. For example, Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself 
from all cases that came before the U.S. Solicitor General’s 
Office during her tenure as Solicitor General.
22
 While that 
decision has resulted in dozens of recusals across several 
Supreme Court terms, and therefore dozens of cases decided by 
eight Justices, only two tie votes have resulted.
23
 It may seem 
surprising that such a large number of recusals by one of the 
Court’s more liberal justices led to so few tie votes, but this is in 
keeping with history. A study by Ryan Black and Lee Epstein 
found that between 1986 and 2003, only eleven tie votes 
occurred due to discretionary recusals.
24
 
Notwithstanding the rarity of recusals leading to ties, the 
prospect of an equally divided Court has led modern Justices to 
recuse themselves only reluctantly. The Justices released a 
policy on recusal in 1993 that explained “[e]ven one 
unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court. . . . 
In this Court, where the absence of one Justice cannot be made 
up by another, needless recusal deprives litigants of the nine 
Justices to which they are entitled, produces the possibility of 
an even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting 




President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s famous “court packing plan,” there has 
been no serious effort to change the number of Justices on the Supreme Court. 
See Justin R. Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21–22 
(2012). 
 22. During her first term on the Court, Justice Kagan recused herself in 
twenty-eight of the seventy-five cases before the Court. Stephen Wermiel, 
SCOTUS for Law Students: Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 
2012, 9:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-students-
sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/. 
 23. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011); Costco 
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
 24. Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally 
Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 92 (2005). 
 25. Supreme Court of the United States, Statement of Recusal Policy 
(Nov. 1, 1993), http://eppc.org/docLib/20110106_RecusalPolicy23.pdf. Chief 
Justice John Roberts readopted the 1993 policy when he assumed his position 
on the Court. See Lyle Denniston, Roberts’ Recusal Policy, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sept. 30, 2005, 4:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2005/09/roberts-recusal-
policy/. Justices have expressed similar concerns in denying motions to 
disqualify; Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., denying 
motion for disqualification); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of 
Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (Scalia, J., denying motion for disqualification); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1038–39 (2004) (discussing the Court’s policy that a 
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Second, a vacancy can leave the Court with an even 
number of Justices. Retirements and resignations do not, 
however, always create such vacancies. Some Justices, like 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, condition their resignation on 
the confirmation of a replacement Justice.
26
 
The death of a sitting Justice is, of course, certain to result 
in at least a temporary vacancy. Almost half of individuals that 
have served as Justices on the Supreme Court (50 of 112 
individuals) have died during their service.
27
 The frequency of 
such deaths, however, has, dwindled over time. Only ten 
Justices have died in office since 1925, and only Chief Justice 




The length of vacancies—whether created by retirement or 
death—has also decreased. During the 19th Century, nine 
vacancies remained unfilled for more than three-hundred days, 
and the longest vacancy, which occurred in the 1840s, lasted 
841 days.
29
 The duration of vacancies has in general become 
shorter and more consistent. The average duration of the most 
recent fifteen vacancies was just 55 days.
30
 Only the vacancy 
created by Justice Lewis Powell’s retirement lasted for more 
than 200 days; Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the Court 237 
days after Justice Powell retired,
31
 but that delay occurred 
because the Senate failed to confirm then-Judge Robert Bork, 





Justice will not recuse themselves from a case in which a law firm the Justice 
is associated with represents one of the parties). 
 26. See William Branigan et al., Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Resigns, 
WASH. POST (July 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100653.html. 
 27. See List of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Supreme_ 
Court_of_the_United_States (last visited July 6, 2016). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Drew Desilver, Long Supreme Court Vacancies Used to Be More 
Common, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch 
.org/fact-tank/2016/02/26/long-supreme-court-vacancies-used-to-be-more-
common/. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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C. THE FREQUENCY AND IMPORTANCE OF TIE VOTES 
Between 1925 and 2015, tie votes were rare, occurring an 
average of less than two times per term. Perhaps because 
vacancies have become increasingly rare, and Justices have 
become increasingly reluctant to recuse themselves, this 
number has dwindled over time. In the twenty-five year period 




Despite the rarity of tie votes, commentators and even the 
Justices themselves express concern that tie votes may create 
confusion and non-uniformity of federal law. While disagreeing 
with that assessment themselves, Professors Lisa McElroy and 
Michael Dorf have explained that “it could be argued that even 
one 4–4 split can be harmful.”
34
 In denying a motion seeking his 
recusal, Justice Rehnquist wrote “affirmance of [conflicting 
lower court decisions] . . . by an equally divided Court would lay 
down ‘one rule in Athens, and another in Rome,’ with a 
vengeance.”
35
 Upon his retirement, Justice John Paul Stevens 
also expressed concern about tie votes, reportedly suggesting 
that the prospect that a recusal might result in a tie votes was 
of sufficient moment to justify legislation providing for 
appointment of a substitute Justice.
36
 
Examination of twenty-one cases between 1986 and 2010 
suggests that tie votes do not, however, result in a prolonged 
lack of uniformity in federal law.
37
 Some of those cases involved 
no split of authority among the lower courts and in others 
either the Supreme Court resolved such a split in relatively 
short order in a subsequent case or the lower courts themselves 
reached a consensus. Moreover, the federal judicial system is 
designed precisely to facilitate non-uniformity, which in 
essence involves doctrinal experimentation as the judges in 




 33. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part IV.B. 
 34. Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and 
Policy Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation 
on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 95 (2011). 
 35. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., denying 
motion for disqualification). 
 36. 156 CONG. REC. S7791 (Sept. 29, 2010) (Statement of Senator Patrick 
Leahy). 
 37. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part IV.B. 
 38. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2003) (describing percolation of issues in lower 
courts). 
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Supreme Court also often declines to review cases that involve 
splits of authority among lower courts, and there is no reason 
that the often-temporary extension of such non-uniformity 
caused by tie votes should be particularly troublesome.
39
 
D. THE DANGER OF TIE VOTES 
Data about tie votes reveal that they have been both 
relatively rare and doctrinally inconsequential. That does not 
mean, however, they are unimportant.
40
 
Tie votes may threaten the public’s perception of the 
Supreme Court, particularly at the present moment when the 
public already views the Court as highly politicized. An order 
affirming by equal division equates to an admission that the 
Justices have failed to fulfill their obligation to resolve a case 
before them and they have done so because they have been 
unable to compromise. 
Additionally, cognitive psychology suggests that tie votes 
may create at least some risk that Justices will become 
entrenched in their views, prejudging future cases that present 
the same issue. This effect, sometimes referred to as the lock-in 
effect, occurs when individuals become increasingly committed 
to a position or viewpoint after resources have been expended 
based on their expression of that position or viewpoint.
41
 The 
lock-in effect is by no means absolute, but on the margins it 
may skew the decisions of Justices after a tie vote has occurred. 
Finally, in rare circumstances a tie vote in the Supreme 
Court may effectively resolve a legal issue for the nation. This 
can occur when federal law contains an exclusive review 
provision, vesting only one lower court with jurisdiction over a 
particular issue.
42
 Because a tie vote will affirm that decision, it 
will leave in place binding authority in the only court in the 
country that can consider the issue. For example, a deadlocked 
Supreme Court decision in the challenge to the Clean Power 
Plan would effectively make the eventual D.C. Circuit’s 
decision binding nationwide because the Plan cannot be 
challenged in any other lower court.
43
 The same result would 
 
 39. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 
(2008). 
 40. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part V. 
 41. See, e.g., Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary 
Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 783–84 (2014). 
 42. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b). 
 43. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
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occur if the Supreme Court divided evenly in a case where a 
lower court issued a nationwide injunction. For example, a 
deadlock in United States v. Texas would resolve the legality of 
the Obama Administration’s policy to defer deportation for 
certain individuals violating federal immigration law for the 
nation because the lower court enjoined implementation of that 
policy everywhere in the Country.
44
 
II. TIE VOTES DURING THE SCALIA VACANCY 
The Supreme Court is in the midst of what could be a 
prolonged period in which it will be made up of only eight 
Justices. This comes at a time when the Court has been as 
polarized as at any point in modern history. While tie votes 
have been of little historical moment, current conditions could 
lay the groundwork for an anomalous period in which a 
significant number of important and high-profile cases equally 
divide the Justices. Such a result could significantly magnify 
the dangers posed by tie votes, particularly to the perceived 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court. 
The Court’s October Term 2015 opinions that have post-
dated Justice Scalia’s death suggest, however, that the Court 
may be actively seeking to avoid resolving cases by equal 
division. While three decisions have involved tie votes, the most 
in any term in recent decades, in two other cases the Court has 
deployed delaying tactics to postpone resolution of contentious 
legal issues. While the Court does not appear to have DIGged 
any cases because of the prospect of a tie vote, the strategies it 
has used have produced similar results. 
A. TIE VOTES AFTER JUSTICE SCALIA 
So far, the Court has equally divided in three cases in the 
wake of Justice Scalia’s death. While that number exceeds the 
number of ties in any year since 1989, it does not dramatically 
depart from historical trends.
45
 Strikingly, however, one of the 
cases in which the Court evenly divided was among the most-
 
 44. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 
S. Ct. 906 (2016). [Editor's note: for further analysis on the recent outcome of 
this case, please see the Epilogue section below.] 
 45. For example, two cases involved tie votes in 2011: American Electric 
Power, Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) and Flores-Villar v. United 
States, 131. S. Ct. 2312 (2011). 
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watched cases of the term, something which does depart from 
historical trends. 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association may be the 
highest-profile tie vote in recent history.
46
 The case involved the 
ability of public-sector unions to collect a fee to pay for 
collective-bargaining activities from employees that declined to 
join the union,
47
 a practice the Supreme Court had approved of 
in the 1977 decision Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.
48
 
Prior to Friedrichs, two recent decisions undermined Abood, 
each of which made it more difficult for public-sector unions to 
collect fees from non-union members.
49
 Conservatives hoped 
that the Court would find an opportunity in Friedrichs to 
reverse Abood entirely.
50
 The questions Justice Scalia asked at 
the oral argument suggest that, had he lived, conservatives 
may well have secured the victory for which they hoped.
51
 In 
the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, however, the Friedrichs case 
ended with a tie vote. 
A second case, Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 
was resolved in its entirety by a tie vote. The case involved a 
Federal Reserve regulation interpreting a provision of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) that prohibits 
discrimination against people seeking loans on the basis of 
marital status.
52
 The regulation interprets that prohibition as 
making it illegal for lenders to require a spouse to guarantee a 
loan taken out by the other spouse.
53
 Despite the regulation, the 
banks involved in the case required the husbands of Valarie 
 
 46. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, 5 Cases to Watch as Supreme Court Term 
Begins, POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/ 
supreme-court-abortion-obamacare-214400. 
 47. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1–2 (Dec. 
5 2013, C.D.Cal.), summarily aff’d 2014 WL 10076847 (Nov. 18, 2014, 9th 
Cir.). 
 48. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 49. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Service 
Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 227 (2012). 
 50. See, e.g., James Sherk, Supreme Court Case May Bring Workplace 
Freedom to Government Employees, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 5, 2016), http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/corner/429250/government-employee-unions-
supreme-court-case-friedrichs-v-california-teachers. 
 51. See Charlotte Garden, What Will Become of Public-Sector Unions 
Now?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2016/02/scalia-friedrichs/462936/. 
 52. See Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 940 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
 53. Id. 
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Hawkins and Janice Patterson to guarantee loans issued to 
their wives.
54
 Both the district court and court of appeals held 
that the Federal Reserve’s regulation improperly interpreted 
the ECOA, and that therefore the guarantees offered by the 
husbands were enforceable.
55
 While commentators at the oral 
argument believed the Justices were likely to agree with the 
lower courts and find the regulation invalid,
56




Finally, Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt 
involved a tie vote on a significant preliminary issue in the 
case, although the Justices were ultimately able to dispose of it 
on a secondary issue of little importance.
58
 The case involved a 
Nevada taxpayer suing the Franchise Tax Board of California 
in a Nevada court.
59
 In a 1979 decision, the Supreme Court had 
held that state sovereign immunity did not bar one state from 
being sued in the courts of another state,
60
 and in Franchise 
Tax Board, California asked the Supreme Court to overrule 
that decision.
61
 At argument, it appeared likely that a majority 
of the Justices, including Justice Scalia, were poised to grant 
California’s request.
62
 Instead, the Court divided equally on 
that question. Six Justices then held that the Nevada court had 
erred by awarding damages against California that were 
greater than the court could have awarded against Nevada 
itself, a decision of little lasting importance.
63
 
B. TIE VOTE AVOIDANCE AFTER JUSTICE SCALIA 
In at least two cases, the Court appeared to have deployed 
a delaying tactic to avoid a tie vote. While the Court has yet to 
 
 54. Id. at 939. 
 55. Id. at 941. 
 56. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious of 
Longstanding Protections for Spouses Forced to Guarantee Each Other’s 
Debts, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 6, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/ 
10/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-of-longstanding-protections-for-
spouses-forced-to-guarantee-each-others-debts/. 
 57. Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
 58. 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016). 
 59. Id. at 1279–80. 
 60. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
 61. 136 S. Ct. at 1279. 
 62. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Seeking Two-Century-Old 
Guidance, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 7, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2015/12/argument-analysis-seeking-two-century-old-guidance/. 
 63. Id. at 1281–82. 
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DIG a case because the Justices are poised to evenly divide, the 
strategies they have deployed have had the similar effect of 
delaying resolution of a legal issue that appeared to divide the 
Justices, but without requiring the Court to issue an order 
affirming by equal division. 
In Zubik v. Burwell, the Court managed to avoid a tie vote 
in another of the most-watched cases of the term.
64
 The case, 
which involved seven separate lower court decisions, involved a 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”).
65
 Specifically, 
religious organizations argued that the provisions of the ACA 
that enabled them to opt out of providing contraceptive 
coverage to their employees violated their religious freedom.
66
 
Argument in the case occurred after Justice Scalia’s death, and 
the Court appeared headed toward a tie vote.
67
 The Court then 
issued an order requesting additional briefing on potential 
alternative means of accommodating the religious views of the 
plaintiffs.
68
 After supplemental briefs had been filed, the Court 
issued a per curium order declining to address the merits. 
Rather, the Court remanded to the lower courts to consider the 
alternatives that the parties had discussed. In so doing, the 
Court stated that it “express[ed] no view on the merits of the 
cases.”
69
 In other words, rather than dividing equally and 
reinforcing perceptions of the politicization and polarization of 
the Court, the Justices issued a unanimous order delaying their 
consideration of the merits of challenges to the opt-out 
provisions. 
The Court deployed a similar strategy in Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins.
70
 The case presented the Court with an opportunity to 
clarify the type of injury necessary for a plaintiff to have 
standing to sue in federal court when Congress creates 
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 A decision in the case requiring proof of 
concrete actual injury to a plaintiff invoking a statutory right 
had the potential to foreclose many class-action lawsuits and 
substantially limit Congress’s ability to create statutory 
rights.
72
 The Court again declined to address that contentious 
legal issue and, instead, six Justices joined an opinion finding 
that the lower courts analysis was “incomplete” and, therefore, 
a remand was appropriate for the lower court to reconsider the 
standing issue.
73
 In other words, in Spokeo a majority of the 
Justices again chose to pursue a strategy that avoided a 
decision affirming by equal division and instead chose to 
postpone consideration of a contentious legal issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia exerted considerable influence on American 
law during his time on the Court. He also left behind an eight-
member Court viewed by the public as polarized and 
politicized. Undoubtedly, the living Justices remain deeply 
divided. They, however, may be finding common ground. The 
specter of evenly dividing in high-profile cases at a time when 
large segments of the public have come to view the Court as a 
political, rather than legal, institution, may be encouraging the 
Justices to find new, better ways to proceed. Two cases decided 
this year seem to provide fodder for optimism, as the Court has 
issued orders postponing the resolution of controversial issues 
without reaching a deadlock. History suggests that the cases 
resolved by tie votes remain unimportant and uncommon. With 
sufficient will and creativity, the Court can continue that 
tradition. 
EPILOGUE 
As this essay goes live, my optimism about compromise on 
the Court has soured considerably. On June 23, 2016, the Court 
announced that it had deadlocked in United States v. Texas and 
Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
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 The significance of these tie votes is more than 
numeric, although five tie votes in what amounts to about 
three-quarters of a Supreme Court term is a striking number,
75
 
and the term is not yet over. The tie vote in United States v. 
Texas is particularly striking to me. The case involves a 
signature initiative of the Obama Administration and affects 
the lives of millions of people living in the United States. And 
as I discussed in my Essay, the lower court also issued a 
nation-wide injunction that purports to bind the federal 
government throughout the country, rather than an order 
limited to the states within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit. 
The decision does involve only a preliminary injunction, and as 
a result the case may ultimately return to the Supreme Court 
for a resolution of the merits of the case, hopefully after a ninth 
Justice has been appointed. Nonetheless, a deadlock that 
affects so many people related to an issue as highly contentious 
as immigration law may have long-lasting reverberations. This 
is particularly true because, when coupled with the tie vote in 
Friedrichs, the Court has now failed to resolve two of the 
biggest cases on its docket. As a result, I suspect that the public 
will, at least for a while, no longer view tie votes as anomalous. 
I also suspect these decisions—or really, lack of decisions—will 
significantly increase the erosion of public trust in the 
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